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Abstract. In wireless roaming a mobile device obtains a service from some foreign network while
being registered for the similar service at its own home network. However, recent proposals try to
keep the service provider role behind the home network and let the foreign network create a tunnel
connection through which all service requests of the mobile device are sent to and answered directly
by the home network. Such Wireless Roaming via Tunnels (WRT) offers several (security) benefits
but states also new security challenges on authentication and key establishment, as the goal is not
only to protect the end-to-end communication between the tunnel peers but also the tunnel itself.
In this paper we formally specify mutual authentication and key establishment goals for WRT and
propose an efficient and provably secure protocol that can be used to secure such roaming ses-
sion. Additionally, we describe some modular protocol extensions to address resistance against DoS
attacks, anonymity of the mobile device and unlinkability of its roaming sessions, as well as the
accounting claims of the foreign network in commercial scenarios.
Key words: Authentication, end-to-end security, key exchange, mobile networks, security model,
tunnel, wireless roaming
1 Introduction
In the today’s world of mobility one may observe the increasing popularity of wireless networks and
devices, both in companies and private households. In many environments wireless technology is the
default access technology for a variety of services. Its ubiquity combined to the demands on mobility
leads to the interesting research area of wireless roaming.
The main goal of wireless roaming is to provide a mobile device that is registered at its own home
network where it can access certain services, e.g. diverse Internet and mobile (phone) applications, with
similar services when it roams to another foreign network. The problem is that the foreign network is
usually not aware whether the mobile device is authorized to request a roaming connection, and the
mobile device may not know whether the foreign network is authorized to provide this connection (as a
contract partner of the home network).
Current solutions for wireless roaming deployed in wireless local networks (WLANs) and also in mo-
bile phone networks (GSM, CDMA, UMTS, CDMA2000) assume that the requested service is provided
directly by the foreign network. The actual involvement of the home network is reduced to the neces-
sary actions related to the authentication of the mobile device and the foreign network as well as the
establishment of a security association (e.g., session keys) between these two entities.
The recent proposal for wireless roaming by Sastry et al. [54] is conceptually different. Instead of
considering the foreign network as the actual service provider they suggest to keep this role behind the
home network by establishing an opaque tunnel connection between the networks and using it to provide
the mobile device with the requested service.
The main technical contribution of our work is the design of a formal security model for authentication
and key establishment in Wireless Roaming via Tunnels (WRT, for short) and its realization through
a suitable protocol. Section 2 introduces the WRT concept as a solution for various practical problems.
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Section 3 describes related work on authentication and key establishment in wireless roaming. In the scope
of the security model in Section 4 we describe basic trust assumptions on the protocol participants and
specify necessary mutual authentication and key exchange requirements. For the proposed protocol, called
AWRT, those basic version is described in Section 5 we give detailed security analysis with respect to the
specified security goals, provide some efficiency remarks and brief ideas on the practical realization of the
tunneled connection. In Section 6 we address several (modular) protocol extensions dealing with forward
secrecy for the established keys, stricter resistance against various types of DoS attacks, anonymity and
unlinkability issues for the roaming mobile device, and the use of the protocol in commercial scenarios, in
which the foreign network is supposed to be reimbursed for the maintenance of the tunnel. We conclude
in Section 7.
2 Wireless Roaming via Tunnels
In the following, we introduce the general concept of WRT and illustrate the main differences between
our architecture and the original proposal [54]. We then present the advantages and disadvantages of
using tunnels as an alternative way to obtain services. Finally, we identify the desired security goals for
this new approach.
2.1 The Concept
The main scenario we deal with is that a mobile device, that belongs to a home network (e.g., its company)
temporary moves to a foreign network which cannot authenticate it directly. The mobile user would like
to access the Internet as a general service from this network under the same conditions and (security
and network) policies as within its home network. For this, an opaque tunnel is created from the foreign
network to the home network and all the packets sent by the mobile device are sent via this tunnel to its
home network that forwards them to the Internet if appropriate.
The only currently available solution for the tunnel-based roaming by Sastry et al. [54] is based on
VPN tunnels securing the end-to-end communication between the mobile device and its home network.
In their scheme the foreign network accepts every device without any authentication and grants it access
to the home network over the Internet. The mobile device can thus initiate a VPN connection (using
NAT traversal techniques if necessary). However, this solution has several weaknesses. First, the Internet
access granted by the foreign network, even a restricted one, may bear intrusion risks to its infrastruc-
ture. Second, the mobile device must comply with the network layer infrastructure of the foreign network
(e.g., IPv4/IPv6, IP assignment via DHCP). Third, VPN tunnels do not provide any proof to the for-
eign network that the mobile device is connecting to its real home network as a VPN connection can
be established to any server on the Internet. Fourth, foreign and home networks do not authenticate
each other and, as a consequence, neither accounting mechanisms nor quality-of-service contracts can be
securely implemented. We fairly remark that Sastry et al. were focusing on the actual architecture for
the city-wide WiFi roaming rather than dealing with the related authentication and key establishment
goals.
Our approach is different. We increase the involvement of the foreign network into the roaming process
by considering it as an inherent part of the security architecture with the obvious goal to eliminate the
above mentioned weaknesses. In our setting the foreign network does not simply agree to grant the mobile
device a restricted Internet access to the claimed home network but is responsible for the establishment
of the tunnel connection between the both after having verified their authenticity. To achieve the desired
goals we propose a three-party authentication and key establishment protocol between the mobile device,
the foreign and the home network. This protocol permits the authentication of participants and exchange
of relevant session keys — not only for the end-to-end secure communication between the device and its
home network but also for the secure communication with the foreign network. The successful execution
of our protocol means that the foreign network will tunnel all the data sent by the mobile device from
its access point to its home network, lowering the risk of intrusion into its own infrastructure.
Authenticated Wireless Roaming via Tunnels: Making Mobile Feel at Home 3
2.2 Pro and Contra
The concept of WRT appears attractive mostly because of the additional security benefits which it offers
and because it shifts the role of the service provider back to the home network, this in contrast to the
non-tunnel-based approach.
WRT offers several benefits for the foreign network. First, the automatic forwarding of messages
provides better protection of the foreign network’s infrastructure, reducing the risk of unauthorized access
and intrusion attempts by malicious devices. Second, in WRT the mobile device appears to the outside
world (e.g., when accessing a server on the Internet) as part of its home network. Therefore, if a mobile
device misbehaves (e.g., up-/downloads illegal content or mounts DoS attacks) causing investigation and
IP traceback, the foreign network cannot be blamed or blacklisted for it; Robert et al. [51] argue that
WRT would lower the risk for the involvement of the foreign network into the legal investigations resulting
from such malicious activities. Additionally, using WRT effectively prevents the mobile device from using
any value-added services to which the access is granted based on the IP membership within the domain
of the foreign network (e.g., access to digital libraries).
WRT still requires mutual authentication between the mobile device and its home network. This
eliminates impersonation attacks in case that the foreign network misbehaves. In contrast to the non-
tunnel-based approach, WRT may effectively prevent DNS manipulations by the foreign network; thus,
thwarting pharming attacks [58]. In WRT the home network may effectively enforce own security policies
regarding the provided service. In particular, the mobile device may access the same set of services while
it roams, whereas in the non-tunnel-based approach it can access services offered by the foreign network.
For example, considering the connection to the Internet, some networks may impose firewall restrictions
on the use of diverse Internet application protocols. A mobile user which roams to a network with stricter
policies can then still execute applications he is used to within his own home network.
In commercial roaming scenarios where the foreign network has to be reimbursed for the provided
roaming service, WRT can significantly simplify and strengthen the accounting process since both net-
works can keep track on the duration of the roaming connection and the amount of data being transferred
independently of each other.
One may think, that the use of WRT would result in the significant increase of the communication
latencies, as every service request has to be sent and answered through the communication link between
the foreign and the home network. Obviously, this delay which relates to the round-trip time could
vary depending on the networks and their geographic location. For example, it has been shown that in
country-wide context (on the example of USA) the expected round trip latencies for the TCP/IP traffic
remains below 150 ms [38], while in the intercontinental context they remain below 250 ms for over 90%
of the residential broadband hosts [26]. These examples show that for many applications such as web
surfing and email the additional latencies in WRT would remain almost unnoticeable, and the quality
of provided service may still be sufficient even for some real-time applications such as Voice-over-IP for
which – according to the ITU-T recommendations [35] – a one-way trip latency below 400 ms might still
be acceptable.
2.3 Desired Security Goals
Suitable WRT authentication and key establishment protocols should take care of protecting not only the
end-to-end communication between the mobile device and the home network but also their communication
with the foreign network.
Obviously, the mobile device and its home network must authenticate each other prior to the use of
the tunnel and establish a session end-to-end key, that is considering the foreign network as a potential
man-in-the-middle attacker. To the contrary, in the non-tunnel-based approach the authentication of the
home network towards the mobile device is usually not required and the session key for the roaming
communication is established between the mobile device and the foreign network.
Further, it is desirable for both networks to mutually authenticate each other prior to the establishment
of the tunnel. This would lower the risk of attacks against the infrastructure of both networks, including
DoS attacks. In commercial scenarios where the foreign network should be reimbursed for the established
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tunnel this mutual authentication would be useful to implement the accounting process, possibly in real-
time. Further, since the mobile device and the foreign network may not be aware of each other prior to the
protocol execution, the mutual authentication between the networks would indirectly prevent roaming
sessions where either the mobile device (hosted by the home network) or the foreign network is not
authorized to request or establish the tunnel connection, respectively.
In WRT the actual service requests are sent and answered through the established tunnel and can,
therefore, be protected using end-to-end keys. However, the home network and the mobile device may also
wish to exchange certain control messages directly with the foreign network; in particular, checks that the
mobile device and the home network are still connected, requests to close the established connection, and
accounting messages in commercial scenarios. In order to protect such messages and also achieve better
robustness of the roaming session (in particular, against session hijacking and data injection attacks) it is
desirable to provide the foreign network and the tunnel end-peers with an additional session tunnel key;
this key is specific to WRT and is not required for the non-tunnel-based roaming.
In addition to the previously mentioned mutual authentication and key establishment goals those
formal specification and realization represents the main focus of this work, there are additional goals
which we informally address to the end of the paper. Some of them aim to achieve higher robustness of
WRT, e.g., protection against DoS attacks. The goal here is to minimize the risk that one party keeps
an open connection to another party during the protocol execution without being able to verify whether
that party is a valid protocol participant. Another desired goal for WRT in commercial scenarios is to
provide the foreign network with some verifiable information to compose its accounting claims. Further
security goals address the profiling of the mobile users. In particular, it might be desirable to hide the
user’s identity from the guest network and achieve unlinkability of its roaming sessions as it is currently
the case in GSM/UMTS through the use of TMSI.
3 Related Work on Authentication and Key Establishment in Wireless
Roaming
Many authentication and key establishment protocols for wireless roaming have been proposed so far, in
both academia and industry (as part of standardization), ranging from mobile phone networks of the 2nd
generation (GSM, CDMA) and 3rd generation (UMTS, CDMA2000) over to WLANs (IEEE 802.11 [1]).
3.1 Wireless Roaming in Mobile Phone Networks.
Most of the standard authentication and key establishment protocols for mobile phone networks, e.g.,
[2, 29, 52], are based on the pre-shared key between the home network and its mobile device. These
protocols establish the session key between the mobile device and the foreign network. Several solutions
have been further proposed to allow roaming among different mobile phone networks. For example, the
authenticated roaming between GSM and UMTS has been specified within the UMTS standard [2] and
partially addressed in [3], and the roaming procedure between UMTS and CDMA2000 has been addressed
in [37].
3.2 Wireless Roaming in IP Networks.
In wireless IP networks, the access control is usually implemented based on the IEEE 802.11i security
architecture, either using pre-shared keys (WPA, WPA2) or using the IEEE 802.1X specification. Al-
though pre-shared keys are widely used for home and small-office networks, these does not actually fit
for roaming. In larger networks, preference is given to IEEE 802.1X that is based on EAP [5], a protocol
framework for the transmission of the authentication information between clients and networks. The ac-
tual protocols implemented within this framework are referred to as EAP methods and can be based for
example on usernames and passwords, shared keys, or public-key certificates (supplied by the client, the
server, or both). EAP using TTLS [32] is used for roaming purpose within the Eduroam infrastructure
composed of the European education institutions that have reached an agreement [28]. Eduroam uses
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EAP-TTLS in association with RADIUS servers hosted in each partner to authenticate and grant an
Internet access to students and personnel visiting another institution. Another widely used form of au-
thentication in WLANs, recommended by Wi-Fi alliance as a best practice solution [6], is web-based such
that the mobile user provides own credentials as input to the browser form. This technique when based
on the username / password is also known as the Universal Access Method (UAM), see also [7, 8, 41] for
some variations. These credentials are usually forwarded to the authentication server (e.g., RADIUS). As
noticed in [43] such web-based solutions become vulnerable to the access point impersonation, address
spoofing, and dictionary attacks. Some improvements to UAM supporting further types of credentials
reducing the required user interaction to opening a web-browser have been described by McCann et
al. [41].
Salgarelli et al. [53] suggested a general roaming authentication framework based on the shared keys
which can be implemented as an EAP method. Their protocol extends the classical Needham-Schroeder
technique [46] to accommodate the authentication servers of the foreign and the home network while
minimizing the communication rounds between them. Previously, Molva et al. [45] described another
roaming protocol based on shared keys, which was designed for the integration into the IBM’s Kryp-
toKnight authentication and key distribution framework. Merino et al. [42] proposed a Single Sign-On
authentication architecture based on 802.1X and EAP-TLS [57] relying on the Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). Their method can be combined with any web-based authentication method, e.g., UAM. The draw-
back of this approach is that the mobile device is assumed to be able to check the validity of the foreign
network’s certificate while being off-line. Furthermore, the use of public-key operations might be costly
for performance-constraint mobile devices. Similar drawbacks appear in the authentication protocols
from [9,33]. Long et al. [40] suggested a roaming protocol based on the modified SSL handshake assum-
ing that mobile device are equipped with public-key certificates, so that the protocol can be executed
without active involvement of the home network. Ribeiro et al. [49] described a roaming authentication
approach based on IPsec VPNs and a hierarchy of certification authorities. The aforementioned problems
with validation of public-key certificates by the mobile device were solved by Meyer et al. [44] via secret
sharing technique [55]. In their protocol described as an extension of EAP-TLS [57] each foreign network
is assumed to hold a share of the home network’s secret key and the respective public-key certificate of
the home network is pre-installed at the mobile device. During the execution of the protocol (which is a
modified TLS handshake) the foreign and the home network need to cooperate in order to perform the
required signature and decryption operations.
Additionally, we mention the commercial system Fon [30], which sells own Wi-Fi routers that mediate
the authentication of mobile devices to a Fon server using MAC/IP address filter technique. As noted
in [54] the deployed address filter technique allows address spoofing attacks. Another commercial system
Wisher [60] requires that foreign networks distribute WPA keys to authorized guests. Obviously, this
approach does not protect from the redistribution of the obtained keys by possibly malicious guests.
The aforementioned solutions proposed for wireless non-tunnel-based roaming (in mobile phone and
wireless IP networks) have been designed with the main goal to authenticate (and provide a session key
to) the mobile and the foreign network, whereby some approaches require the interaction with the home
network. The only currently available solution for the tunnel-based roaming by Sastry et al. [54] has
already been discussed in Section 2.1.
4 Authentication and Key Establishment Model for WRT
Here we model authentication and key establishment goals of a WRT protocol (denoted as Π within the
model). Our definitions extends the classical two-party model from [13].
4.1 Communication Model
Protocol Participants and Long-Lived Keys We consider a home network H, a mobile device M
registered with H, and a foreign network F as participants of Π. In practice H and F can be seen as
corresponding authentication servers. We do not distinguish between the participants and their identities,
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which are assumed to be unique; the identity of a mobile deviceM is assumed to be unique within its own
home network H. All protocol participants are modeled as probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) machines.
We assume that participating H, F , andM are in possession of their corresponding long-lived keys LLP ,
P ∈ {M,F ,H}, which are used in different executions of Π. We assume that all long-lived keys as well
as further secrets used in Π are polynomially bounded with respect to some security parameter κ.
Instances and Protocol Sessions In order to model participation ofM, F , andH in distinct sessions of
Π we consider an unlimited number of instances: By [P, s] we denote the s-th instance of P ∈ {M,F ,H}
where s ∈ N.
An instance [P, s] may be invoked for one session. Throughout the protocol execution [P, s] may learn
its unique publicly known session id sidsP . Instances of M, F and H that hold identical session ids
sidsM = sid
s
F = sid
s
H are partnered, i.e. participate in the same session.
Upon the protocol invocation the instance [P, s] is initialized with the long-lived key LLP and turns
into a processing state where it proceeds according to the protocol specification, until it collects enough
information to decide whether the protocol execution was successful (we say an instance accepts) or not
(we say an instance aborts). Finally, the instance terminates meaning that it stops processing any further
protocol messages. In a WRT protocol different participants have different acceptance criteria, i.e., an
instance of F accepts when it is ready to create the tunnel, in particular after the computation of the
session tunnel key Kt ∈ {0, 1}κ, whereas the instances of M and H accept when they are ready to
communicate with each over the tunnel, in particular after the computation of the session end-to-end key
KM,H ∈ {0, 1}κ (in addition to Kt).
4.2 Security Model
Security Associations and Commitments The mobile deviceM and its home networkH are assumed
to maintain some security association (as a result of the initialization), and to accept the provided tunnel
connection if they can successfully authenticate each other upon the tunnel establishment.
To the contrary, there is no security association between M and F prior to the execution of Π, i.e.
M and F need not to be aware of each other, which is fairly natural in the case of roaming. Therefore,
in questions related to the authorized WRT participation both, M and F , rely on H.
On the other hand, as part of their contract we assume that F creates a tunnel to H if it successfully
authenticates H, whereas H accepts the provided tunnel after the successful authentication of F (in
addition to the authentication of M). Nevertheless, this does not rule out attacks by malicious F trying
to impersonate M towards H.
Adversarial Model The adversary A modeled as a PPT machine is assumed to have complete control
over the protocol invocation and the communication channels. Additionally, we allow A to corrupt parties.
However, we will restrict this latter ability of A in a meaningful way upon defining the actual security
goals. We model possible actions of A through the following set of queries:
- Invoke(P,m): This is the protocol invocation query that can be asked for some entity P ∈ {M,F ,H}.
In response, a new instance [P, s] is created and A is given its first outgoing message. The optional
input m indicates the message expected by the instance to start the execution; for the initiator of the
protocol m is supposed to be empty.
- Send(P, s,m): This query models communication control by A and contains a message m which
should be delivered to the s-th instance of P ∈ {M,F ,H}. The adversary can decide honestly to
forward protocol messages between the instances in order to eavesdrop the protocol execution (that
is A remains passive) or to manipulate or inject messages (that is A becomes active). In response, A
receives the outgoing message of [P, s], or an an empty message if [P, s] terminates having processed
m.
- Corrupt(P ): This query models corruptions of P ∈ {M,F ,H}. In response, A receives LLP . As soon
as A corrupts P , all instances of P are also treated as corrupted.
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- RevealKey(P, s): This query models independence of end-to-end keys computed by the instances of
P ∈ {M,H} in different sessions. In response, A is given KM,H held by the instance; the query is
answered only if [P, s] has accepted.
- RevealTunnelKey(P, s): This query models independence of tunnel keys computed by the instances of
P ∈ {M,F ,H} in different sessions. In response, A is given Kt held by the instance; the query is
answered only if [P, s] has accepted.
Correctness The following definition of correctness, given from the perspective of one particular session,
specifies the purpose of Π with respect to the tunnel creation and key establishment.
Definition 1 (Correctness). An authentication and key establishment protocol for WRT Π is correct
if in the presence of a passive adversary A the invoked instances of M, F , and H terminated having
accepted and all of the following holds: M and H hold the same end-to-end key KM,H; M, F , and H
hold the same tunnel key Kt.
Security Goals We start by defining the requirement of mutual authentication (MA) between the
instances ofM and H. In order to reduce the complexity of the model (and proofs) Definition 2 captures
additional sub-goals related to the agreement on the session end-to-end and tunnel keys computed by
the instances of M and H, i.e., that at the end of the successful protocol execution both instances hold
identical keys (these sub-goals are expressed through conditions 3 and 4). The significant difference is
that for the agreement on the tunnel key Kt, the foreign network F should remain uncorrupted, whereas
no such restriction is made for the mutual authentication between M and H and the agreement on the
end-to-end key KM,H. This models possible attacks of a malicious F trying to impersonate either M or
H or to influence a disagreement on the established session end-to-end key KM,H. Since the tunnel key
Kt will be used to protect control messages for the maintenance of the tunnel (and not to protect the
actual service requests ofM and responses of H) we refrain from consideration of maliciousM, H, or F
aiming to compromise the agreement on Kt.
Definition 2 (MA between M and H). Given a correct protocol Π by Gamema-m-hΠ (A, κ) we denote
the interaction between the instances of M, F and H with a PPT adversary A that is allowed to query
Invoke, Send, Corrupt, RevealKey, and RevealTunnelKey. A wins if at some point during the interaction:
(1) an uncorrupted instance of M accepts but there is no uncorrupted partnered instance of H, or
(2) an uncorrupted instance of H accepts but there is no uncorrupted partnered instance of M, or
(3) uncorrupted partnered instances of M and H accept without holding the same session end-to-end key
KM,H, or
(4) F is uncorrupted and uncorrupted partnered instances of M and H accept without holding the same
session tunnel key Kt.
The maximum probability of this event over all adversaries (running in time κ) is denoted
Succma-m-hΠ (A, κ) = maxA |Pr[A wins in Gamema-m-hΠ (A, κ)]|.
Π provides mutual authentication between M and H if this probability is negligible in κ.
Our next Definition 3 aims to define similar goals with respect to the instances of F and H: in
particular the mutual authentication requirement (conditions 1 and 2), and the requirement related to
the agreement on the tunnel key Kt (condition 3). Note that the mutual authentication between F and
H does not depend on the honesty of M that can be corrupted by A. Similar to the previous definition
M, F , and H are treated as honest with respect to the agreement on Kt.
Definition 3 (MA between F and H). Given a correct protocol Π by Gamema-f-hΠ (A, κ) we denote
the interaction between the instances of M, F and H with a PPT adversary A that is allowed to query
Invoke, Send, Corrupt, RevealKey, and RevealTunnelKey. A wins if at some point during the interaction:
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(1) an uncorrupted instance of F accepts but there is no uncorrupted partnered instance of H, or
(2) an uncorrupted instance of H accepts but there is no uncorrupted partnered instance of F , or
(3) M is uncorrupted and uncorrupted partnered instances of F and H accept without holding the same
session tunnel key Kt.
The maximum probability of this event over all adversaries (running in time κ) is denoted
Succma-f-hΠ (A, κ) = maxA |Pr[A wins in Gamema-f-hΠ (A, κ)]|.
Π provides mutual authentication between F and H if this probability is negligible in κ.
Here, we provide some observations concerning Definitions 2 and 3 with respect to the authorization
issues. Recall, that according to our model instances of protocol participants are seen as partnered if they
hold the same session ids. This implies that any protocol Π which satisfies both of the above defined
mutual authentication requirements ensures that if an uncorrupted instance of H accepts then there are
uncorrupted instances of M and F that are also partnered. That is the decision of H to accept in some
session of Π implies that H treatsM and F as authorized participants of a WRT session. Since our model
does not consider malicious M, F , or H aiming to disrupt the agreement on Kt the above mentioned
“transitive”partnering between the instances ofM and F ensures that all partnered instances that accept
in some protocol session hold the same session tunnel key Kt.
In the following we focus on the secrecy of KM,H and Kt. For this, we make use of the classical notion
of authenticated key exchange (AKE) security (cf. [13,21,22]), adopted to the setting of our model. The
basic idea of AKE-security in WRT is to model the indistinguishability of KM,H and Kt computed in
some test session from some randomly chosen values by any outsider adversary. The significant difference
is that for KM,H a possibly malicious foreign network F should be also treated as such adversary.
In order to model the AKE-security of the end-to-end key KM,H we first specify the auxiliary notion
of e2e-freshness for the instances ofM and H, which defines the conditions under which A can be treated
as an outsider with respect to the test session for which it has to distinguish KM,H. In particular, these
conditions prevent active participation of A on behalf of eitherM or H by restricting A from respective
corruptions, and capture known-key attacks allowing A to reveal end-to-end keys computed in sessions
that are different from the test session. Moreover, A is not restricted from revealing Kt. That is the
knowledge of Kt (e.g., by F) should not compromise the end-to-end communication security betweenM
and H.
Definition 4 (e2e-Freshness). In the execution of Π an instance [P, s] with P ∈ {M,H} is e2e-fresh
if none of the following holds:
– A asks Corrupt(P );
– Case P =M: A asks RevealKey(M, s) after [M, s] has accepted or RevealKey(H, t) after [H, t] has
accepted and [M, s] and [H, t] are partnered;
– Case P = H: A asks RevealKey(H, s) after [H, s] has accepted or RevealKey(M, t) after [M, t] has
accepted and [H, s] and [M, t] are partnered.
In order to model the AKE-security of the tunnel key Kt we specify the auxiliary notion of t-freshness,
this time for the instances of M, F , and H, which defines the conditions under which A can be treated
as an outsider with respect to the test session for which it has to distinguish Kt. These conditions are
widely similar to those defined for the e2e-freshness except that A is now allowed to reveal tunnel keys
computed in sessions that are different from the test session, and is not restricted from revealing KM,H.
Definition 5 (t-Freshness). In the execution of Π an instance [P, s] with P ∈ {M,F ,H} is t-fresh if
none of the following holds:
– A asks Corrupt(P );
– Case P =M: A asks RevealTunnelKey(M, s) after [M, s] has accepted or RevealTunnelKey(P ′, t) for
P ′ ∈ {H,F} after [P ′, t] has accepted and [M, s] and [P ′, t] are partnered;
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– Case P = F : A asks RevealTunnelKey(F , s) after [F , s] has accepted or RevealTunnelKey(P ′, t) for
P ′ ∈ {M,H} after [P ′, t] has accepted and [F , s] and [P ′, t] are partnered;
– Case P = H: A asks RevealTunnelKey(H, s) after [H, s] has accepted or RevealTunnelKey(P ′, t) for
P ′ ∈ {M,F} after [P ′, t] has accepted and [H, s] and [P ′, t] are partnered.
Further, we introduce two additional queries TestKey(P, s) and TestTunnelKey(P, s). The query TestKey(P, s)
can be asked to an instance of P ∈ {M,H} and is answered only if the instance [P, s] has already ac-
cepted. The answer of this query is based on some secret bit b ∈ {0, 1} chosen in advance. In response to
TestKey(P, s)A is given eitherKM,H (if b = 1) or a randomly chosen value from {0, 1}κ (if b = 0). The only
difference between TestKey(P, s) and TestTunnelKey(P, s) is that for the latter we assume P ∈ {M,F ,H}
and the key which is returned in the case that bit b = 1 is the tunnel key Kt.
Now we are ready to formally define AKE-security for the end-to-end and tunnel keys computed in
Π. Using the auxiliary definitions of e2e- and t-freshness we can provide one definition for both goals.
Definition 6 (E2E / Tunnel AKE). Given a correct protocol Π, a uniformly chosen bit b, a type
of AKE-security α ∈ {ake-e2e, ake-t}, and a PPT adversary A with access to the queries Invoke, Send,
Corrupt, RevealKey, RevealTunnelKey, and TestKey (if α = ake-e2e) or TestTunnelKey (if α = ake-t), by
Gameα,bΠ (A, κ) we denote the following interaction between the instances of M, F and H with A:
– A interacts with instances via queries;
– Case α = ake-e2e: at some point A asks a TestKey query to an instance [P, s] which has accepted and
is e2e-fresh (and remains such by the end of the interaction);
Case α = ake-t: at some point A asks a TestTunnelKey query to an instance [P, s] which has accepted
and is t-fresh (and remains such by the end of the interaction);
– A continues interacting with instances and when A terminates, it outputs a bit, which is then set as
the output of the interaction.
A wins if the output of Gameα,bΠ (A, κ) is identical to b. The maximum probability of the adversarial
advantage over the random guess of b, over all adversaries (running in time κ) is denoted
AdvαΠ(A, κ) = maxA |2 Pr[Gameα,bΠ (A, κ) = b]− 1|.
If this advantage is negligible in κ and α = ake-e2e (or α = ake-t) then Π provides end-to-end (or tunnel)
AKE-security.
Remark 1. Our notions of freshness restrict A from corruptions of M and H (in e2e-freshness) and
from corruptions of M, F , and H (in t-freshness). This implies that our definitions of AKE-security do
not consider forward secrecy. This is done on purpose, since the basic version of our protocol specified
and formally analyzed in Section 5 does not provide this property, mainly for the reasons of efficiency,
resulting in a possible use of the protocol for the performance-constrained mobile devices. Nevertheless,
in Section 6.1 we show, how forward secrecy for KM,H and Kt can be easily achieved using the classical
Diffie-Hellman technique [25].
5 Authentication and Key Establishment Protocol for WRT
In the following we introduce AWRT — our protocol for authentication and key establishment for WRT
between M, F , and H. This section describes its basic version, analyzes security and evaluates perfor-
mance. Optional security extensions and the discussion on the use of AWRT in commercial networks are
postponed to Section 6.
5.1 Building Blocks
AWRT uses several (well-known) cryptographic primitives:
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– A pseudo-random function PRF : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}∗ which is used for the purpose of key
derivation and can be realized using block-ciphers or keyed one-way hash functions. By AdvprfPRF(κ) we
denote the maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries (running within time κ) in distinguishing
the outputs of PRF from those of a random function better than by a random guess.
– An asymmetric encryption scheme satisfying the property of indistinguishability under (adaptive)
chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) [48] whose encryption and decryption operations are denoted
E and D, respectively. By Advind-cca2(E,D) (κ) we denote the maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries
(running within time κ) in breaking the IND-CCA2 property of (E ,D) better than by a random
guess; The property of IND-CCA2 security is for example preserved in the several encryption schemes
including RSA-OAEP [14,31], Cramer-Shoup [24], and DHIES [4].
– A digital signature scheme which provides existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks
(EUF-CMA) whose signing and verification operations are denoted Sig and V er, respectively. By
Succeuf-cma(Sig,V er)(κ) we denote the maximum success probability over all PPT adversaries (running within
time κ) given access to the signing oracle in finding a forgery; Examples of such schemes include
DSS [47] and PSS [15], though schemes that provide a stronger version of EUF-CMA (cf. [17,34]) can
be applied as well.
– A message authentication code function MAC that satisfies weak unforgeability against chosen message
attacks (WUF-CMA) [12], e.g., the popular function HMAC [10,11] can be used for this purpose. By
Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ) we denote the maximum success probability over all PPT adversaries (running within
time κ) given access to the MAC oracle in finding a MAC forgery.
5.2 Initialization
We assume that prior to the execution of AWRT the involved parties are in possession of the following
long lived keys: LLF consists of a private/public signature/verification key pair (skF , vkF ) and a de-
cryption/encryption key pair (dkF , ekF ); LLH consists of a private/public signature/verification key pair
(skH, vkH) and a pair (M, (kM,αM)) where (kM, αM) is a high-entropy secret key consisting of a PRF
key kM and a MAC key αM shared with the hosted M; consequently LLM consists of (kM, αM). Note
that in practice it is sufficient for H and M to share kM and derive the corresponding MAC key αM as
PRFkM(l) for some publicly fixed label l.
Further we assume that the public keys of networks are known amongst them in advance (implied
by their contract). They can also be handled via self-signed or classical PKI certificates. F and H can
choose their long-lived keys independently and H can choose kM for each hosted M according to their
assumed trust relationship.
Remark 2. Since the networks F and H can usually swap their roles (e.g., bidirectional roaming contracts
between H and F , or a roaming contract among some set of networks from which F and H can be seen as
any two chosen networks), LLH may include some (dkH, ekH) and LLF may also include (M, (kM, αM))
for each mobile device M hosted by F .
Remark 3. For the purpose of efficiency and scalability it might be desirable for the networks to use a
single private/public key pair to decrypt and to sign. There exist several secure schemes that support both
operations with the same public key pair (and could be deployed in our protocol), e.g., [23]. Nevertheless,
the use of the same key pair in two different operations contradicts to the general principles of a secure
protocol design and is, therefore, not recommended.
5.3 Protocol Execution
In the following we provide some explanations on the techniques used in our AWRT protocol and their
relationship to the security goals. The actual specification is illustrated in Figure 1.
First, we mention an optional time-stamp T which can be chosen by F and sent to H in order to address
possible accounting issues in commercial roaming scenarios where F should be reimbursed for the provided
tunnel connection; more discussion on this can be found in Section 6.4.
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Mobile Device M
{(kM, αM)}
Foreign Network F
{(skF , vkF ), (dkF , ekF )}
Home Network H
{(skH, vkH), (M, (kM, αM))}
rF ∈r {0, 1}κ; A := F|rF
←− A−−−−
rM ∈r {0, 1}κ; B :=M|rM
−
B|H
−−−−→
if H INVALID
then ABORT else
C := A|B
−
C|[T ]
−−−−−−→
parse C as F|rF |M|rM
if [T OR] M INVALID
then ABORT else
rH ∈r {0, 1}κ
sidH := C|H|rH
kt := PRFkM(l1|sidH)
χ := EekF (kt)
µH := MACαM(0|sidH)
D := rH|χ|µH
σH :=
SigskH(sidH|[T ]|χ|µH)
←−
D|σH−−−−−−
parse D as rH|χ|µH
sidF := C|H|rH
if σH INVALID
then ABORT else
kt := DdkF (χ)
E := rH|µH
←− E−−−−
parse E as rH|µH
sidM := A|B|H|rH
if µH INVALID
then ABORT else
kt := PRFkM(l1|sidM)
µM := MACαM(1|sidM)
Kt := PRFkt(l2|sidM)
KM,H := PRFkM(l3|sidM)
ACCEPT
−
µM−−−−→
σF := SigskF (sidF |µM)
Kt := PRFkt(l2|sidF )
ACCEPT
CREATE TUNNEL
−
µM|σF−−−−−−→
if µM OR σF INVALID
then ABORT else
Kt := PRFkt(l2|sidH)
KM,H := PRFkM(l3|sidH)
ACCEPT
Fig. 1. Illustration of the basic version of AWRT between the participating mobile device M, foreign
network F , and home network H. At the end of the protocol: M and H hold the end-to-end key KM,H;
M, F , and H hold the tunnel key Kt, so that the tunnel between M and H can be established by F .
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AWRT uses publicly known distinct labels li, i = 1,. . .,3, which are fixed in advance and used as input
to PRF to derive various secret keys at different protocol stages.
In AWRT each party P ∈ {M,F ,H} computes own session id sidP as a concatenated bit string
F|rF |M|rM|H|rH where rP denotes a random nonce chosen by P .
The end-to-end key KM,H is derived byM and H as the output of PRF (with label l3 and the session
id) using the shared secret key kM. Obviously, the equality sidM = sidH is necessary for M and H to
compute the same value of KM,H. The assurance of this equality is given toM through the MAC value µH
since the corresponding MAC key αM is known only to M and H. Similarly, H gains this assurance from
the MAC value µM. Observe that bits 0 and 1 are used as additional inputs for the computation of µH
and µM, respectively, to break the “symmetry” and guarantee that µH 6= µM. Due to the construction of
session ids from fresh nonces (seen as challenges) the successful verification of these MAC values provides
also the mutual authentication between M and H.
The mutual authentication between F and H is achieved via digital signatures σH and σF as the
signed messages include sidH and sidF , respectively.
The tunnel key Kt is derived by M, F , and H as the output of PRF (with label l2 and the session
id) using the pre-tunnel key kt which is computed by the parties in two different ways: M and H derive
kt from PRF (with label l1 and the session id) using the shared secret kM, whereas F obtains kt via
decryption from the cipher-text χ received from H. The protection of χ by σH ensures F that H holds
the same value for kt. Since F produces σF subsequently to the verification of σH the validity of σF
ensures H that the cipher-text χ was delivered to F without modification allowing F to decrypt the same
value for kt. Note that the mutual authentication between M and H also implies that the partnered
instances of these two parties derive the same value for kt too.
5.4 Security Analysis
In this section we prove that AWRT satisfies the previously defined security goals. In all our theorems by
q we denote the total number of the invoked protocol sessions in the corresponding interactions between
the adversary A and the protocol participants. We start by proving the defined mutual authentication
goals.
Theorem 1 (MA between M and H). Given a WUF-CMA secure MAC the basic version of AWRT
described in Figure 1 provides mutual authentication between the participating mobile device and its home
network in the sense of Definition 2, and
Succma-m-hAWRT (κ) ≤
2q2
2κ
+ 2Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ).
Proof. (Sketch) In our proofs we apply the meanwhile classical proving technique from [56]. Here we
construct a sequence of games Gi, i = 0, . . . , 2 and denote by Winma-m-hi the event that an adversary
A breaks the mutual authentication between M and H in game Gi, i.e., wins in the corresponding
interaction as described in Definition 2. Note that A is allowed to corrupt F for the winning conditions
(1) – (3), but not for (4).
Game G0. [Real protocol ] This is the real Gamema-m-hAWRT (κ) played between a simulator ∆ and a PPT
adversary A. ∆ simulates the actions of the participating M, F , and H according to the protocol speci-
fication and answers all queries of A.
Game G1. [Collisions for chosen nonces rM and rH] In this game the simulation aborts if during
the interaction the simulator chooses the same random nonce rM resp. rH on behalf ofM resp. H in two
different protocol sessions. Considering the collision probability for the same nonce to be chosen twice we
obtain
|Pr[Winma-m-h
1
]− Pr[Winma-m-h
0
]| ≤ 2q
2
2κ
. (1)
Note that since in AWRT a session id of P ∈ {M,F ,H} is computed as concatenated string F|rF |M|rM|H|rH
this game rules out the occurrence of the same session ids computed by the instances of M and H in
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two different sessions, regardless of the chosen rF . In particular, this game implies that sidM and sidH
remain unique for each invoked session.
Game G2. [MAC forgeries for µH and µM] This game is identical to Game G1 with the only exception
that ∆ fails if A asks a Send query to an instance of M containing a valid MAC value µH not previously
output by an instance of H or a Send query to an instance of H containing a valid µM not previously
output by an instance of M.
The probability that the simulation aborts can be upper-bounded through the probability of forging
any of the both MAC values. To see this, consider∆ given access to the MAC oracle.∆ simulates the execution
of AWRT according to the specification except that it computes µH and µM through the corresponding
oracle calls. In case that the simulation aborts ∆ is in possession of a valid MAC value (representing either
µH or µM) which was not obtained through any previous oracle call. Hence, ∆ can easily output it as a
forgery. This implies
|Pr[Winma-m-h
2
]− Pr[Winma-m-h
1
]| ≤ 2Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ). (2)
Having eliminated possible forgeries for µH and µM we observe that since these MAC values are computed
over the session ids sidH and sidM, respectively, that according to the previous game are unique for
each new session, this game rules out any successful replay attacks using µH and µM. Therefore, any
successful verification of µH by an instance of M and of µM by an instance of H implies that there are
two instances ofM and H that hold the same session ids, and are, therefore partnered. Since verification
of µH and µM is the necessary requirement for the acceptance of the instances of M and H in AWRT we
follow that this game ensures mutual authentication between M and H and excludes attacks by which
A can win based on conditions (1) and (2).
Further, we focus on the attacks based on conditions (3) and (4). Since the session end-to-end
key KM,H is derived by the instances of M and H in a deterministic way as PRFkM(l3, sidM) and
PRFkM(l3, sidH), respectively, it follows that if any two partnered instances ofM and H accept then they
hold identical values for KM,H, i.e. the probability of A to win in this game through condition 3 is 0.
Finally, we observe that if any two partnered instances of M and H accept then they hold the tunnel
key Kt computed in a deterministic way as PRFkt(l2, sidM) and PRFkt(l2, sidH), respectively. Hence, the
probability that A wins in this game through condition 4, is upper-bounded by the probability that
these partnered instances have computed different values for the pre-tunnel key kt. Since kt is derived
by the partnered instances of M and H in a deterministic way as PRFkM(l1, sidM) and PRFkM(l1, sidH),
respectively, thus using the same values for kM and the session ids, it follows that the probability of A
winning in this game through condition 4 is also 0. Summing up the discussed probabilities of A to win
in this game based on conditions 3 and 4 we obtain
Pr[Winma-m-h
2
] = 0. (3)
Combining the previous equations, we conclude the proof. uunionsq
Theorem 2 (MA between F and H). Given a EUF-CMA secure (Sig, V er) the basic version of AWRT
described in Figure 1 provides mutual authentication between the participating foreign and home networks
in the sense of Definition 3, and
Succma-f-hAWRT (κ) ≤
2q2
2κ
+ 2Succeuf-cma(Sig,V er)(κ).
Proof. (Sketch) Similar to the previous proof we construct a sequence of games Gi, i = 0, . . . , 2 and
denote by Winma-f-hi the event that A breaks the mutual authentication between F and H in game Gi,
i.e., wins in the corresponding interaction as described in Definition 3. Note that A is allowed to corrupt
F for the winning conditions (1) – (2), but not for (3).
Game G0. [Real protocol ] This is the real Gamema-f-hAWRT (κ) played between a simulator ∆ and a PPT
adversary A. ∆ simulates the actions of the participating M, F , and H according to the protocol speci-
fication and answers all queries of A.
Game G1. [Collisions for nonces rF and rH] Similar to the proof of Theorem 1 we abort the simu-
lation in this game if during the interaction ∆ chooses the same random nonce rF resp. rH on behalf of
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F resp. H in two different protocol sessions. Thus,
|Pr[Winma-f-h
1
]− Pr[Winma-f-h
0
]| ≤ 2q
2
2κ
. (4)
Obviously, this game implies that sidF and sidH remain unique for each invoked session, regardless of
the chosen rM.
Game G2. [Signature forgeries for σH and σF ] This game is identical to Game G1 with the only
exception that ∆ fails if A asks a Send query to an instance of F containing a valid signature σH not
previously output by an instance of H or a Send query to an instance of H containing a valid signature
σF not previously output by an instance of F .
Assume that ∆ simulates the protocol execution according to the specification except that it is given
access to the signing oracles which it queries in order to obtain the corresponding signatures σH and
σF on behalf of H and F , respectively. In case that the simulation aborts ∆ is in possession of a valid
signature (representing either σH or σF ) which was not obtained through any previous oracle call, and
can, therefore, be returned by ∆ as a corresponding forgery. Hence,
|Pr[Winma-f-h
2
]− Pr[Winma-f-h
1
]| ≤ 2Succeuf-cma(Sig,V er)(κ). (5)
Since each of these signatures is computed over the corresponding session id sidF or sidH (amongst other
inputs), respectively, that according to the previous game are unique for each new session, this game rules
out any successful replay attacks. Since verification of σH by an instance of F and verification of σF by
an instance of H is the necessary requirement for the acceptance in AWRT we follow that upon acceptance
of any instance of F (or H) there is a corresponding partnered instance of H (or F). This implies the
mutual authentication between F and H and excludes attacks by which A can win based on conditions
(1) and (2).
Further, we focus on the attacks based on condition (3). Observe, that if two partnered instances of F
and H accept then the exchanged signatures sidF or sidH between these instances were valid (and also
not replayed). This implies that the integrity of the cipher-text χ transmitted to the instance of F was
preserved. Since decryption D is a deterministic operation we follow that upon acceptance both partnered
instances of F and H hold the same value for the pre-tunnel key kt, which is used by the instances to
derive the tunnel key Kt prior to acceptance. Hence, the probability that partnered instances of F and
H accept with two different tunnel keys in this game is 0, i.e.
Pr[Winma-f-h
2
] = 0. (6)
Combining the previous equations, we conclude the proof. uunionsq
Now we focus on the AKE-security of the established session end-to-end and tunnel keys.
Theorem 3 (End-to-End AKE). Given a WUF-CMA secure MAC and a pseudo-random PRF the basic
version of AWRT described in Figure 1 provides end-to-end AKE-security in the sense of Definition 6, and
Advake-e2eAWRT (κ) ≤
4q2
2κ
+ 4Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ) + 4qAdv
prf
PRF(κ).
Proof. (Sketch) As in the previous proofs we construct a sequence of games Gi, i = 0, . . . , 4 and denote
by Winake-e2ei the event that A breaks the end-to-end AKE-security of AWRT in game Gi, i.e., wins in the
corresponding interaction as described in Definition 6 (for the case α = ake-e2e).
Game G0. [Real protocol ] This is the real Gameake-e2eAWRT (κ) played between a simulator ∆ and a PPT
adversary A. ∆ simulates the actions of the participatingM, F , and H according to the protocol specifi-
cation and answers all queries of A. Recall, that the TestKey query is asked by A to an e2e-fresh instance
of either M or H which has previously accepted. In order to prevent A from active participation on
behalf of eitherM or H we first exclude possible impersonation attacks against any of these parties. For
this we utilize games G1 and G2 from the proof of Theorem 1.
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Game G1. [Collisions for nonces rM and rH] The simulation in this game aborts (and the output
bit of the interaction is set at random) if the same random nonce rM (or rH) is chosen by ∆ on behalf
of M (or H) in two different protocol sessions, implying
|Pr[Winake-e2e
1
]− Pr[Winake-e2e
0
]| ≤ 2q
2
2κ
. (7)
Game G2. [MAC forgeries for µH and µM] The simulation in this game aborts (and the output bit
of the interaction is set at random) if A asks as part of its Send query to M (or to H) a valid MAC value
µH (or µM) which was not previously output by an instance of H (or M), so that
|Pr[Winake-e2e
2
]− Pr[Winake-e2e
1
]| ≤ 2Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ). (8)
Having eliminated possible forgeries and replay attacks with respect to µH and µM we observe that
any e2e-fresh instance of M (or H) which accepts has a partnered instance of H (or M) which is also
e2e-fresh.
Game G3. [Pseudo-randomness of kt] This game is identical to Game G2 except that ∆ in each
session chooses the pre-tunnel kt at random on behalf of an instance of H instead of deriving it via PRF
and uses the same value in the simulation of the corresponding partnered instance of M (to preserve
consistency). Following the classical reductionist argument we obtain
|Pr[Winake-e2e
3
]− Pr[Winake-e2e
2
]| ≤ qAdvprfPRF(κ). (9)
Note that this game ensures independence between kt (used to derive the tunnel key Kt) and the shared
key kM (used to derive the end-to-end key KM,H). We remark that the randomly chosen kt is also sent
encrypted in χ to F ensuring the consistency between the tunnel key computed by the possibly corrupted
instances of F and uncorrupted instances of H and M.
Game G4. [Pseudo-randomness of KM,H] This final game is identical to Game G3 except that ∆
in each session chooses KM,H at random on behalf of an instance of M instead of deriving it via PRF
and uses the same value in the simulation of the corresponding partnered instance of H (to preserve
consistency), so that
|Pr[Winake-e2e
4
]− Pr[Winake-e2e
3
]| ≤ qAdvprfPRF(κ). (10)
As a result of this game the answer given to A in response to its TestKey query to some e2e-fresh instance
of M or H is a completely random value, regardless of the chosen bit b. Obviously, the probability of A
to win in this game is given by the probability of a random guess, i.e.
Pr[Winake-e2e
4
] =
1
2
. (11)
The combination of the above equations concludes the proof. uunionsq
Theorem 4 (Tunnel AKE). Given a EUF-CMA secure (Sig, V er), a IND-CCA2 secure (E ,D) and a
pseudo-random PRF the basic version of AWRT described in Figure 1 provides tunnel AKE-security in the
sense of Definition 6, and
Advake-e2eAWRT (κ) ≤
6q2
2κ
+ 4Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ) + 4Succ
euf-cma
(Sig,V er)(κ) + 2qAdv
ind-cca2
(E,D) (κ) + 6qAdv
prf
PRF(κ).
Proof. (Sketch) In the following we construct a sequence of games Gi, i = 0, . . . , 7 and denote by Winake-ti
the event that A breaks the tunnel AKE-security of AWRT in game Gi, i.e., wins in the corresponding
interaction as described in Definition 6 (for the case α = ake-t).
Game G0. [Real protocol ] This is the real Gameake-tAWRT(κ) played between a simulator ∆ and a PPT
adversary A. ∆ simulates the actions of the participating M, F , and H according to the protocol spec-
ification and answers all queries of A. Recall, that the TestTunnelKey query is asked by A to a t-fresh
instance of either M, F , or H which has previously accepted. Note in particular, that the notion of
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t-freshness excludes any corruptions ofM, F , and H. In order to prevent A from active participation on
behalf of either of these parties we first exclude possible impersonation attacks.
Game G1. [Collisions for nonces rF , rM, and rH] The simulation in this game aborts (and the
output bit of the interaction is set at random) if the same random nonce rF , rM, or rH is chosen by ∆
on behalf of F , M, or H, respectively, in two different protocol sessions. Thus,
|Pr[Winake-t
1
]− Pr[Winake-t
0
]| ≤ 3q
2
2κ
. (12)
Game G2. [MAC forgeries for µH and µM] The simulation in this game aborts (and the output bit
of the interaction is set at random) if A asks as part of its Send query to M (or to H) a valid MAC value
µH (or µM) which was not previously output by an instance of H (or M). Obviously,
|Pr[Winake-t
2
]− Pr[Winake-t
1
]| ≤ 2Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ). (13)
Having eliminated possible forgeries and replay attacks with respect to µH and µM we observe that any
t-fresh instance of M (or H) which accepts has a partnered instance of H (or M) which is also t-fresh.
Game G3. [Signature forgeries for σH and σM] The simulation in this game aborts (and the output
bit of the interaction is set at random) if A asks as part of its Send query to F (or to H) a valid signature
σH (or σF ) which was not previously output by an instance of H (or F), so that
|Pr[Winake-t
3
]− Pr[Winake-t
2
]| ≤ 2Succeuf-cma(Sig,V er)(κ). (14)
Having eliminated possible forgeries and replay attacks with respect to σH and σF we observe that any
t-fresh instance of F (or H) which accepts has a partnered instance of H (or F) which is also t-fresh. In
particular, the combination of this and the previous game ensures that if at least one t-fresh instance of
some protocol party accepts then there exist partnered instances of the other two parties, which are also
t-fresh.
Game G4. [Pseudo-randomness of KM,H] This game is identical to Game G3 except that ∆ in each
session on behalf of any partnered instances ofM and H chooses the end-to-end key KM,H as a random
value and not as an output of PRF, s.t.
|Pr[Winake-t
4
]− Pr[Winake-t
3
]| ≤ qAdvprfPRF(κ). (15)
This game ensures independence between the pre-tunnel key kt and KM,H which may be revealed by A
without compromising the t-freshness of the instance.
Game G5. [Pseudo-randomness of kt] This game is identical to Game G4 except that ∆ in each
session on behalf of the partnered instances ofM and H chooses the pre-tunnel key kt as a random value
and not as an output of PRF, s.t.
|Pr[Winake-t
5
]− Pr[Winake-t
4
]| ≤ qAdvprfPRF(κ). (16)
Note that in this game ∆ computes χ as an encryption of this random value.
Game G6. [Security of χ] In order to exclude any information leakage about kt upon its transmission
to F we consider the following game, in which ∆ in each session computes χ as an encryption EekF (β)
where β is some randomly chosen value, independent of kt. Note that ∆ derives Kt on behalf of the
partnered instances of F , M, and H still using kt. It is possible to construct a distinguisher with given
access to the real-or-random encryption oracle (and the decryption oracle) that is able to use A in this
and the previous game to break the IND-CCA2 security of (E ,D), s.t.
|Pr[Winake-t
6
]− Pr[Winake-t
5
]| ≤ qAdvind-cca2(E,D) (κ). (17)
Game G7. [Pseudo-randomness of kt] In this final game ∆ proceeds as before except that in each
session on behalf of the partnered instances of M, F , and H it chooses the tunnel key Kt as a random
value and not as an output of PRF. Obviously,
|Pr[Winake-t
7
]− Pr[Winake-t
6
]| ≤ qAdvprfPRF(κ). (18)
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As a result of this game the answer given to A in response to its TestTunnelKey query to some t-fresh
instance of M, F , or H is a completely random value, regardless of the chosen bit b. Obviously, the
probability of A to win in this game is given by the probability of a random guess, i.e.
Pr[Winake-e2e
7
] =
1
2
. (19)
The combination of the above equations concludes the proof. uunionsq
5.5 Remarks on Efficiency
In case of roaming protocols the most significant impact on the communication complexity has the number
of communication rounds on the path with the highest round trip time, i.e. the link between F and H.
Therefore, several solutions for the non-tunnel-based roaming mentioned in Section 3 aim to minimize
this number. However, in a WRT session each request of M would imply one full communication round
between the networks. Nevertheless, it is still desirable to minimize this communication before the tunnel
is created in order to reduce the impact of possible network faults and DoS attacks. With this in mind we
observe that our AWRT protocol requires one full communication round between the networks prior to the
creation of the tunnel by F . The additional half a round needed to deliver the authentication information
to H can be easily interleaved with the first service request of M. In this sense our AWRT protocol is
comparable to the authentication protocols from [45,53].
Further, the specification given in Figure 1 separates messages according to the two simultaneous mu-
tual authentication processes that take place betweenM and H, and between F and H. This significantly
simplifies the proof. However, some communication bandwidth can be saved by removing the MAC value
µM from the last message of F to H, still allowing H to verify µM indirectly, via the verification of σF .
This optimization relies on the assumption that F could not have created valid σF without knowing the
required µM, thus, implying the necessary communication between F and M due to the unforgeability
of MAC and the secrecy of αM.
Finally, we observe that in AWRT the mobile device M does not need to perform any costly public-
key operations, unlike the non-tunnel-based protocols in [9,33,40,42,44] and the WRT approach in [54].
Hence, AWRT can also be used with performance-constraint mobile devices such as PDAs and smart phones
provided they have a wireless IP interface. Note that AWRT uses public-key operations for the transport
of kt and for the mutual authentication between F and H.
Remark 4. If desired, the modularity of AWRT allows to completely remove public-key operations (and
the corresponding long-lived keys) resulting in a more efficient protocol that would nevertheless still
ensure end-to-end security betweenM and H in the presence of F (yet more efficient than [54]) without
providing the tunnel key and the mutual authentication between the networks.
5.6 Ideas on Practical Realization and Tunnel Establishment
The description of AWRT in Figure 1 is kept general. Therefore, in the following we highlight some practical
ideas on the realization of the protocol across the Internet based on the available standards.
The foreign network F will typically participate in AWRT using its own access point to which M
connects on the data-link layer (layer 2) prior to the execution of AWRT. Since the communication between
M and F takes part on layer 2 there is no need for F to assign an IP address to M. Moreover, on the
link between M and F the protocol can be implemented as a new EAP method within IEEE 802.1X.
The home network H can participate in AWRT as a gateway or a protocol-specific server with some known
DNS name or IP address, i.e. protocol messages exchanged between F and H can be transmitted over
Internet through a classical UDP connection.
Once AWRT is successfully executed, F can continue acting as a layer 2 bridge to H for the whole
roaming session. In this wayM can be seen as “local” from the perspective of H, i.e. H can allocate own
IP address for M either as a parameter within AWRT or via DHCP. Messages between M and H can be
tunneled using a simple IP-over-IP or upper layer protocol (such as L2TP [59]). The end-to-end traffic
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between M and H can be protected using the Authentication Header (AH) or Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) mechanisms in the tunnel mode, as defined within IPsec [36], whereby deriving the session
key from KM,H, i.e., without executing IKE [20], the native key exchange protocol of IPsec.
Further, in order to avoid session hijacking attacks (incl. traffic injection), the tunnel path between F
and H can also be secured using AH or ESP mechanisms, this time in the transport mode, whereby the
corresponding session key should be derived from Kt.
6 Optional Protocol Extensions
AWRT can be extended in a modular way to deal with the issues of forward secrecy, resistance to certain
types of DoS attacks, anonymity and unlinkability of roaming sessions, and accounting in commercial
scenarios with the reimbursement of F upon the provided roaming service.
6.1 Forward Secrecy
Roughly speaking the requirement of forward secrecy for some session key means that an adversary should
not be able to break the AKE-security of the protocol even if it gains access to the long-lived keys of
participants after their instances have accepted in the test session. The common way to achieve forward
secrecy is to derive the key from some independent ephemeral secret information which is valid only for
one particular session.
Forward Secrecy of End-to-End Keys In order to achieve forward secrecy for KM,H we can modify
the basic version of AWRT using the classical Diffie-Hellman technique [25] and assuming that the necessary
computations are performed in some cyclic group G of prime order q (polynomial in κ) generated by g.
The idea is to derive KM,H from an ephemeral secret gxMxH (with xM, xH ∈ Zq) as an output of
PRFf(gxMxH )(l3|sid) where f is a randomness extractor (cf. [27]) and sid the corresponding session id.
For this,M must choose its own secret exponent xM and include gxM into its first protocol message, thus
sending B|gxM |H to F which then forwards C|T |gxM to H. In turn, H chooses own secret exponent xH
and includes gxH into its protocol message D|gxH |σH while computing µH over 0|sidH|gxM |gxH allowing
M to check the integrity of delivered gxM and sent gxH . For the same reason,M must compute own µM
over 1|sidM|gxM |gxH . Note that the AKE-security of such KM,H would further rely on the hardness of
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem [16].
Forward Secrecy of Tunnel Keys In order to achieve forward secrecy for Kt we can apply a Gen-
eralized Diffie-Hellman technique, used e.g. in [19] for the purpose of group key exchange. Let G be a
cyclic group and g its generator as described in the previous paragraph. The goal is to derive Kt from an
ephemeral secret gxMxFxH (with xM, xF , xH ∈ Zq) as an output of PRFf(gxMxFxH )(l2|sid). In this case all
computations involving the pre-tunnel key kt become obsolete. Therefore, the modified protocol does not
require to keep the decryption/encryption key pair (dkF , ekF ) as part of the foreign network’s long-lived
key. The protocol proceeds as follows.M includes gxM into its first protocol message B|gxM |H to F which
in turn chooses own exponent xF and sends C|T |gxM |gxF |gxMxF over to H. Then, H chooses own xH and
replies with D′|σH where D′ := rH|gxMxH |gxFxH |µH with µH computed over 0|sidH|gxM |gxFxH (allowing
M to check the integrity of delivered gxM and sent gxFxH), and σH computed over D′|gxM |gxF |gxMxF
(allowing F also to check the integrity of gxM , gxF , and gxMxF , delivered to H in the previous message of
F). F includes gxFxH into its message E|gxFxH toM. Finally,M computes µM over 1|sidM|gxM |gxFxH ,
and F computes σF over sidF |µM|gxMxH . It is easy to check that at the end of the successful protocol
execution all parties are able to compute identical
gxMxFxH = (gxMxF )xH = (gxMxH)xF = (gxFxH)xM
and derive the same Kt. Note that in this case the AKE-security of such Kt would further rely on the
hardness of the Group Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem [18].
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We stress that if forward secrecy should be simultaneously achieved for KM,H and Kt thenM and H
must use different independently chosen exponents for the computation of each of these keys; otherwise
KM,H can be easily recovered using message D′. Note that achieving forward secrecy increases the
protocol costs by additional modular exponentiations.
Remark 5. Some recent work on AKE-security, additionally, strengthens A by allowing it to corrupt
participants or reveal ephemeral secrets used by (uncorrupted) participants during the test session. It
might be possible to apply techniques used in [39] to achieve such strong AKE-security for the session
keys computed in AWRT (at least for the end-to-end key KM,H). However, we leave such discussion out of
scope of the current work.
6.2 Denial-of-Service and Hijacking
Here we present some ideas on how to enhance AWRT towards resistance against some types of DoS
attacks. Due to the higher communication delays on the path between F and H it might be desirable to
decrease the risk that F opens a connection to H for the third protocol message without gaining stronger
confidence that a party which requested the tunnel is a valid mobile device hosted by H; otherwise a
DoS-attacker can compose the second protocol message B|H and then simply close own connection. A
possible solution to minimize this risk is to equip M with a corresponding public key certificate issued
by H and demand a signature on this second message (which also includes a fresh nonce of F). Observe,
that this solution, although computationally expensive, minimizes the risk since the attacker must either
forge the signature or be a holder of some valid certificate. Nevertheless, it is not completely satisfactory
since F is not able to judge (without further interaction) whether the certificate has not been revoked.
One could further reduce the risk by requiring that device certificates are issued for some short validity
period.
A similar threat is given for H which could be forced to keep the connection to F after the fourth
protocol message without gaining stronger confidence that both partiesM and F are legitimate; otherwise
a DoS attacker may flood H with messages of the form C|T and close own connection thereafter. The
risk here can be minimized by requiring that C|T is signed by F whereby the time-stamp T would also
serve as a protection against replay attacks. Note that this signature cannot replace σF from the last
message as this is required for the mutual authentication between F and H. Additional confidence for
H that C|T has been sent by F after the communication with a valid M can be achieved by letting M
compute a MAC value µ′H on the message B|H using αM and F to forward C|T |µ′H (in addition to its
signature) to H. Note that µ′H cannot replace µH as the latter is needed for the mutual authentication
between M and H.
Finally, we consider protection against hijacking of a roaming session, mentioned in [53] for the non-
tunnel-based case. Similarly, in WRT an attacker can wait until the protocol completes and the tunnel
is established and then try to hijack the session fromM or H (or both of them — tunnel hijacking). On
the wireless link between M and F the session can be hijacked by using a more powerful transmitting
device than M, and on the path between F and H a hijacker can be any intermediate communication
node. In WRT this attack may be used to waste the bandwidth resources assigned to the tunnel by F .
Our basic protocol allows for an elegant solution through the use of the tunnel key Kt requiring that each
message which is supposed to be sent through the tunnel during the roaming session is authenticated such
that F is able to verify its validity prior to the delivery. Note that a hijacker cannot bias the end-to-end
communication between M and H which is protected by KM,H.
6.3 Confidentiality of M’s Identity
Whenever a mobile device roams across several foreign networks (contract partners of H) it might be
desirable to keep its identity M undisclosed and even to prevent (possibly colluding) foreign networks
from being able to link its roaming activities, thus eliminating the risk of profiling (examples for this can
also be found in roaming for mobile phone networks, e.g., TMSI in GSM and UMTS). A straightforward
solution is to let M choose some set of “one-time” roaming aliases and reveal them to its home network
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before it roams. Obviously, this solution requires additional storage resources and its most significant
disadvantage is that M must choose (and update) its aliases while being in the area covered by H (see
also the discussion in [45]).
Our AWRT protocol allows for a more elegant approach if we rely on the fact that each home network
usually serves as a foreign network from the perspective of its contract partners. This implies that LLH
used in AWRT also includes a key pair (dkH, ekH). Assuming that M knows ekH we can slightly modify
AWRT by replacing the identityM in the second protocol message with its encrypted equivalent EekH(M)
which will also be used in the construction of session ids. Obviously, upon receiving C|T the home network
would be able to recover M through the corresponding decryption. Due to the IND-CCA2 property of
(E ,D) this solution would ensure not only anonymity of M towards F but also the unlinkability among
different AWRT executions with M; at the cost of one additional public key operation by M and H.
6.4 Reimbursement of F ’s Roaming Costs
In commercial scenarios the foreign network F has to be reimbursed for the provided roaming service.
Since F is not aware of M it usually presents its claims to H. Note that the reimbursement process (as
any payment process) cannot be realized solely using cryptographic techniques. Nevertheless, it might be
desirable to allow F to support its claims with some cryptographic proof, which can also be shown to
some judge. Observe, that in AWRT the foreign network obtains σH computed amongst other parameters
on the identity F and the time-stamp T chosen by F . However, the existence of σH alone does not
guarantee that F created a tunnel to H and actually provided the roaming service. Therefore, upon
the maintenance of the tunnel F may request further signatures σ′H from H computed on some fresh
time-stamp T ′ > T and the session id, and close the tunnel connection if the expected signature is not
delivered. Special control messages exchanged between M and H and protected using keys derived from
KM,H can be specified in order to ensure H (and M) that the tunnel has been created and kept open
during the interval [T, T ′]; otherwise H may refuse to send σ′H. A valid pair (σH, σ′H) would then serve
as a cryptographically protected acknowledgement of H that the tunnel connection was kept open by F
within the time interval [T, T ′].
7 Conclusion
The wireless roaming approach via tunnels preserves the home network’s role as the actual service provider
and has a number of additional security benefits. However, it opens new challenges on the authentica-
tion and key establishment protocol that precedes the establishment of the tunnel connection. Having
formally specified the necessary requirements we designed an appropriate provably secure protocol AWRT
which requires one communication round between the foreign and the home network prior to the creation
of the tunnel. Additionally, we provide some ideas on possible extensions of the basic version of AWRT to-
wards forward secrecy, DoS resistance, anonymity of roaming mobile devices and unlinkability of roaming
sessions, and argued on the possible use of AWRT in commercial scenarios. The most appealing future work
is the detailed specification of the protocol within the EAP framework and its implementation based on
current standards within a suitable WRT architecture (the architecture can be based on the ideas given
in [54]), whereby special attention should be paid to the realization of the tunnel connection, including
the necessary control messages and their protection.
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